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Case No. 20050963-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this criminal case involving class A misdemeanor 
convictions, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the law regarding restitution? 
Standard of Review: This presents a legal issue, to be reviewed without deference, 
for correctness. R&. State v. Bicklev, 2002 UT App 342, f 6, 60 P.3d 582. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved to an extent by trial counsel (e.g. R. 78-84, 
99-111, 114-126). To the extent it was not, this Court should employ the doctrines of 
plain error, exceptional circumstances and ineffective assistance of counsel to grant 
Cabrera full relief. 
PERTINENT STATUTES 
Pertinent statutes are in the addendum to this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Cabrera with two third degree felony counts of DUI with 
serious bodily injury, one class B misdemeanor count of driving without security, one 
class C misdemeanor count of driving left of center, one class C misdemeanor count of 
driving without a license, all occurring on or about May 17, 2003 (R. 1-3). Larry Long 
was Cabrera's trial lawyer (R. 21). 
Cabrera pled guilty to two class A misdemeanor counts of DUI with injury, on 
September 30, 2004 (R. 48). Judge Stephen L. Roth sentenced Cabrera on December 13, 
2004, to two concurrent years in jail and fined him $1,400, and then suspended the fine 
and all but sixty days of jail time and placed him on probation (R. 64-69). The court 
ordered Cabrera to pay half of his net income toward restitution until further order of the 
court (R. 64-69). 
On the State's motion (R. 93-98), and over Cabrera's objection ( e ^ R . 79-84, 99-
111), and after Judge Kennedy initially ruled that the medical bills were not subject to a 
restitution order because they were discharged in bankruptcy (R. 197), Judge Kennedy 
later imposed restitution in the amount of $102,000, requiring Cabrera to pay it at the rate 
of $500 a month, despite the fact that Cabrera earns only $7 an hour (R. 351-360). 
Cabrera timely appealed (R. 361). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Cabrera committed DUI with injury while driving without insurance, and the 
victims incurred substantial medical bills (e.g. R. 212A-212CC, 354). Cabrera filed for 
bankruptcy, listing the victims and their insurance company as creditors before the 
initiation of the criminal case (e^g, R. 212UU, 212VV, 212 III, 212 JJJ, 354). The victims 
and their insurance company received notice of the bankruptcy, but did not file any claims 
with the bankruptcy court (R. 212000). Cabrera's debts in this regard were discharged 
by the bankruptcy court ( e ^ R. 354, R. 212PPP). 
Judge Kennedy initially ruled that he could not order restitution for the medical 
bills, which had been discharged in bankruptcy (R. 197, R. 284), but later reversed 
himself and imposed restitution for Rebecca Mecham's medical bills, lost equity in her 
home, lost wages, and loss of personal property, despite the fact that Cabrera's debts to 
her were discharged in bankruptcy (R. 351-360). 
Judge Kennedy required Cabrera to proceed through the restitution hearing without 
counsel, despite the facts that Cabrera had intended to be represented by present counsel, 
but had been unable to retain present counsel prior to the hearing (R. 410: 1-3). Judge 
Kennedy noted that he had warned Cabrera to notify the court if he would require the 
appointment of counsel, and despite the fact that Cabrera told the court that he failed to 
retain present counsel the day before the hearing, the court required him to proceed 
without any counsel whatsoever (R. 410: 2-3). 
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Judge Kennedy imposed a total amount of $102,000 in restitution, and required 
Cabrera to pay at the rate of $500 per month, despite the fact that Cabrera makes only $7 
an hour (R. 351-360). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel for Cabrera, or in failing to 
continue the restitution hearing until Cabrera could retain counsel. 
The trial court's restitution award was unlawful, not only because it entered on the 
basis of facts found when Cabrera did not have the benefit of counsel, but also because no 
restitution was available under the restitution statute. Because Cabrera's debts to 
Rebecca Mecham were discharged in bankruptcy, she could not have recovered them 
from him in a civil suit, and thus, there were no pecuniary damages subject to recovery 
through restitution under the plain terms of the restitution statute. Our state trial court 
judge had no authority to circumvent the ruling of the federal bankruptcy judge, and 
violated the Supremacy Clause in doing so by ordering Cabrera to pay restitution for 
debts discharged by the bankruptcy court. 
This Court has previously recognized that due process counsels against the entry of 
restitution orders in traffic cases which turn on negligence, because this circumvents the 
defendant's due process rights to litigation of such issues as contributory negligence, 
intervening or alternate causality, and the amount of damages. Here, where the record 
contains indications of contributory negligence by the victim and fails to definitively 
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establish sole or proximate causality by Cabrera, and particularly where he was forced to 
proceed without counsel at the restitution hearing, the court should not have entered the 
restitution order, which circumvented his due process rights and rights to open courts, to 
litigate liability and damages in a civil suit. 
This Court should thus reverse the trial court's restitution award. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF CABRERA'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
VITIATES THE VALIDITY OF THE RESTITUTION HEARING. 
The right to counsel in criminal cases is provided by the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and by Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., 
Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah, 1978). The right to counsel in criminal cases 
is also secured by the Due Process Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
See, e.g.. State v. Spiers, 361 P.2d 509, 510 (Utah 1961). The right to counsel in criminal 
cases is also recognized in the Utah Code, § 77-l-6(l)(a). 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require magistrates to inform criminal 
defendants of their rights to retained or appointed counsel, see Utah R. Crim. P. 7(e)(3), 
and require magistrates to appoint counsel in cases wherein the criminal defendants are 
indigent and face a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty. See Utah R. Crim. 
8(a). 
Cabrera was sentenced to serve jail time in this case (R. 64-69), and was clearly 
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constitutionally entitled to be represented by counsel. See, e.g.. State v. Longcrier, 943 
P.2d 655, 658-59 and n.4 (Utah App. 1997) (defendant is constitutionally entitled to 
counsel if jail time was imposed). 
Restitution hearings are part of the criminal sentencing process, and are thus 
considered substantial steps in criminal prosecution, wherein defendants have the right to 
counsel. See, e.g.. Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 (guaranteeing the right to be 
represented by counsel in criminal prosecutions); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (l)(a) (same); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (sentencing and restitution statute, requiring a "full 
hearing" on restitution if defendant so requests); State v. Breeze, 2001 UT App 200, ^ 6, 
29 P.3d 19 (recognizing defendant right to a "full hearing" on restitution); State v. 
Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1992) (defendant did not receive full hearing on 
restitution, where trial court held hearing without defendant's counsel and then permitted 
him an additional hearing with counsel but refused to hear his evidence). See also, e.g., 
State v. Izzolina, 609 N.W.2d 549, 551-52 (Iowa 2000) (restitution is part of sentence, 
defendant is entitled to counsel in restitution hearing, even if it follows sentencing 
hearing); Hill v. Bradford, 565 So.2d 208, 210 (Ala. 1990) (because restitution hearings 
are component of sentencing, defendant is entitled to counsel). 
When criminal defendants proceed pro se, due process requires trial courts to 
insure that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to 
counsel. Spiers, supra, at 510; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Trial courts 
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are supposed to evaluate all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the 
accused's conduct, background and experience. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 
464(1938). 
In Utah, trial courts are supposed to conduct an in-depth on-the-record colloquy to 
assess whether the defendant understands the risks he undertakes in waiving the right to 
counsel, and is able to make a knowing and voluntary choice in waiving counsel. State v. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). Suggested areas of inquiry include "whether 
defendant has studied law; defendant's experience at self-representation; the charges and 
possible penalties faced; familiarity with, and the expectation of adherence to, procedural 
and evidentiary rules; a warning that the trial court will not direct or advise the defense; a 
recommendation against self-representation; and whether the choice of self-representation 
is voluntary. Finally, appointment of standby counsel should be considered." State v. 
Drobel 815 P.2d 724, 732 (Utah App. 1991). 
Utah law recognizes that when a criminal defendant represents himself at trial in 
the absence of a proper inquiry into the extent of the knowing and voluntary nature of the 
waiver, reversal is required, because trial courts cannot make the necessary findings ^os/ 
hoc. See, State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993). 
In the instant matter, the trial court never informed Cabrera of his right to counsel, 
never conducted a proper colloquy, never obtained a waiver of the right to counsel, and 
never made any of the findings necessary to the waiver that never occurred. Rather, he 
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reminded Cabrera that Cabrera should have notified the court if he needed counsel, and 
then proceeded with the restitution hearing without providing Cabrera with counsel, and 
without obtaining his waiver of that fundamental right. This violated the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Constitution of Utah, Article I 
§§ 7 and 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6, and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 7 and 8, 
supra. The error cannot be corrected by the entry of post hoc findings. See Bakalov, 
supra. 
While the trial court's denial of Cabrera's right to counsel vitiates the restitution 
hearing, see id., no new hearing is required because restitution is barred as a matter of 
law. 
II. 
NO RESTITUTION SHOULD BE AWARDED. 
Under the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(d) and (4)(a), courts 
are empowered to award restitution for pecuniary damages, which are defined by § 76-3-
201(l)(c) as "all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses." 
Because Cabrera's debts to Rebecca Mecham were discharged by the bankruptcy 
court, she could not have recovered them against Cabrera in a civil suit, and they thus did 
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not qualify as pecuniary damages subject to a restitution award under the plain terms of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201, supra. Compare State v. Depaoll 835 P.2d 162, 163-64 
(Utah 1992) (police department was not entitled to restitution for rape kit expenses, 
because police department could not have recovered these expenses from the defendant in 
a civil suit), with State v. Twitchell 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) (restitution 
statute applied because victims could recover the amounts of restitution as pecuniary or 
special damages in a civil suit). 
The $102,000 in restitution awarded in the instant matter was improper because 
Rebecca Mecham could not have recovered that amount from Cabrera through a civil suit, 
because his debts to her were discharged by the bankruptcy court. E.g. R. 354, R. 
212PPP. See In re Barnett 15 BR 504 (Bkrtcy. D. Kansas 1981) (bankruptcy court held 
that any restitution to be ordered in state criminal prosecution for bad check debt 
discharged in bankruptcy would violate Supremacy Clause). 
No restitution would properly be awarded in this criminal case involving no proof 
of criminal intent or causation of the injuries. See State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154. In Robinson, this Court held that it is generally 
inappropriate to impose restitution for damages resulting from traffic violations where 
criminal intent is not a requisite element, because this deprives the defendant of his due 
process rights to a full civil jury determination of such issues as causation and damages. 
860 P.2d at 983. The Court reversed a restitution award in an improper lane change case, 
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because there was no proof that the lane change violation was the proximate cause of the 
injuries, and because the defendant should have his due process rights to establish 
contributory negligence or alternate causality, and to litigate the damages. Id. 
The Robinson Court also noted that the imposition of restitution in such cases 
might violate the defendant's right to open courts. See Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983 n.7. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 11, the open courts provision, expressly recognizes the 
right of access to the courts. "The clear language [of this provision] guarantees access to 
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). Under this provision, Courts are to 
"resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a 
controversy." Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976). "At a minimum, a day 
in court means each party shall be afforded the opportunity to present claims and 
defenses, and have them adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and the law." 
Miller v.USAACas. Ins. Co.. 44 P.3d 663, 674-75 (Utah 2002). 
Here, Mr. Cabrera pled to two counts of DUI with injury, but the description of the 
offenses in the plea form does not clearly establish that Cabrera was the sole proximate 
cause of the injuries. The plea form states: 
On or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I 
operated a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol to a degree that I 
could not safely do so, injuring two people. 
(R. 49). 
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At the restitution hearing, wherein Cabrera was forced to proceed without counsel, 
Rebecca Mecham testified that she turned left in front of an oncoming car with plenty of 
time to make the turn, but that Cabrera's car came from behind the oncoming car and hit 
her car after she had made the turn and pulled off the road (R. 410: 5-6). 
In contrast, Cabrera told the presentence investigator that Mecham drove her car 
into the flow of oncoming traffic and struck his car, and that she was negligent (R. 372, 
PSR, pages 2 and 4). The presentence investigator further noted that "the police report in 
the matter is sketchy," and did not indicate any facts to counter those provided by Mr. 
Cabrera. Id. 
Given the fair opportunity to do so in a civil suit, Cabrera might well be able to 
establish contributory negligence or intervening cause, or might successfully challenge 
the amount of damages, to limit or wholly preclude recovery from him. His rights to due 
process and access to the courts should thus preclude the entry of a restitution award that 
would effectively preclude his opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his claims. 
Compare, e.g., Robinson, supra. 
In awarding restitution, the trial court never addressed whether the amounts 
awarded constituted pecuniary damages which were recoverable in a civil suit and thus 
qualified for restitution, and never considered whether it was appropriate to award 
restitution in this simple traffic case, when issues of causation and damages have yet to be 
litigated (R. 351-360). But see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201, and Robinson, supra. 
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Rather than considering these proper factors under Utah law, the trial court found 
that the bankruptcy court did not discharge Cabrera's debt to Rebecca Mecham for three 
reasons: 
(1) Because the restitution obligation stems from personal injuries which 
were incurred as a direct result of the Defendant's unlawful operation of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the obligation is 
excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. Section 523(a)(9). 
(2) Because the restitution obligation resulted from a plea agreement, which 
is a settlement agreement entered into by the Defendant, it is excepted from 
discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. Setion 523(a)(19)(ii). 
(3) Because the restitution obligation resulted from a court order for 
restitutionary payment, it is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 
U.S.C.A. Section 523(a)(19)(iii). 
(R. 351). 
The trial court's finding that the debts to Rebecca Mecham were not discharged in 
the bankruptcy proceeding is clearly erroneous and there is no evidence to marshal in 
support of that finding. The record unequivocally establishes that the bankruptcy court 
discharged this debt (e.g. R. 212PPP), and the trial court so recognized earlier in his 
ruling (R. 354). 
The trial court was in error in denying the existence of the bankruptcy court's 
discharge order and finding the debts non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.A § 523(a)(9), 
because there is nothing to substantial the trial court's assumption that Mecham's injuries 
were the "direct result" of Cabrera's driving while intoxicated, as opposed to caused by 
her own contributory negligence or some other factor. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(9) 
(excluding from bankruptcy discharge debts "for death or personal injury caused by the 
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debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft if such operation was unlawful 
because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance[.]") 
(Emphasis added). Cf. Robinson and attendant discussion, supra. 
The trial court was in error in finding the debts non-dischargeable as part of a 
settlement agreement under 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(19)(ii), because the discharge occurred 
prior to Cabrera's entry of his plea. See 11 U.S.C. A. § 523 (a)(19)(B)(ii) (exempting 
from bankruptcy discharges debt which "results, before, on, or after the date on which the 
petition was filed, from- ... any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor"). 
Cabrera's entry of the plea is not properly characterized as settlement agreement or as an 
agreement to pay the restitution, for he did not agree to pay restitution in entering the 
plea, but merely signed a form indicating, "I also know that I may be ordered to make 
restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on 
charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement." (R. 51). 
The court was in error in finding the debts nondischargeable as restitution under 11 
U.S.C.A. §523(a)(19)(iii), because the discharge of debt occurred before any restitution 
was ordered. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(B)(19)(iii) (exempting from bankruptcy discharge 
"any court or administrative order for any damages, fine, penalty, citation, restitutionary 
payment, disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment owed by the 
debtor."). 
Even if the trial court's legal opinions about the dischargeability of the debts under 
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the bankruptcy code were correct, it is elementary law that a state court has no power to 
nullify the order of a federal bankruptcy court. See, e ^ , United States Constitution, 
Article VI, Clause 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.")- In seeking to deny and circumvent the bankruptcy 
court's discharge of Cabrera's debt, the trial court violated the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution. See, In re Barnett 15 BR 504 (Bkrtcy. D. Kansas 1981) 
(bankruptcy court held that any restitution to be ordered in state criminal prosecution for 
bad check debt discharged in bankruptcy would violate Supremacy Clause). 
Because Mecham could not have recovered the amount ordered in restitution as 
pecuniary damages in a civil suit, and because Cabrera's due process and open courts 
rights to litigate causation and damages block the entry of a restitution award in any 
event, this Court should reverse the restitution award. See, e.g., Robinson, supra. 
III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT RELIEF 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER TRIAL COUNSEL 
PRESERVED ALL THE ISSUES. 
Trial counsel, Larry Long, filed multiple memoranda opposing the imposition of 
restitution ( e ^ , . R. 78-84, 99-111, 114-126). However, he did not address the basic Utah 
law discussed above regarding the unlawfulness of a restitution order which was 
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precluded by Mecham's legal inability to recover pecuniary damages in a civil suit, e ^ 
Depaoli, supra, and regarding the impropriety of awarding damages in a traffic case 
because causation and damages should be litigated in civil proceedings, e.g., Robinson, 
supra. 
While the issues were not fully preserved in the trial court, this Court should 
nonetheless address them under the doctrines of the exceptional circumstances, plain error 
and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare 
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device"5 to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, U 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are 
particularly appropriate for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
Article I § 12, Cabrera must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below 
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient 
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performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert-
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e ^ , State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at ^ 10, 67 P.3d 
1005. When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes 
objectively deficient performance, which will not be excused by this Court with 
hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) 
(trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the 
client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not conceivably have 
been valid trial strategy). 
The legality of imposing restitution was not a snap decision that was made in the 
heat of battle with the jury present, but could and should have been researched and 
properly presented to the trial court. While trial counsel did argue vigorously against the 
imposition of restitution, he failed to assert the controlling Utah law that was well-
established at the time of the trial court's decisions. See, e.g., Depaoli and Robinson, 
supra. 
Failing to assert this law constituted objectively deficient performance; there was 
and could have been no valid strategic reason for Long to have refrained from asserting 
the controlling law that compelled the proper result for Mr. Cabrera. Compare, e.g.. State 
v. Moritzkv, 771 P.2d 688, 691-93 (Utah App. 1989) (trial counsel provided ineffective 
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assistance in obtaining a jury instruction on defense of habitation which lacked helpful 
presumption provided in amended defense of habitation statute, resulting the denial of a 
fair trial and the need for a new trial). 
Because the controlling law was well established and should have been clear to 
both trial counsel and the trial court, and because the failure to assert and apply it was 
outcome determinative, the erroneous restitution ruling was caused by ineffective 
assistance of counsel and constituted plain error. See, Moritzky; Smedley, and Eldredge, 
supra. 
Because the imposition of restitution was wholly illegal, and was contributed to by 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the trial court's insisting on proceeding with the 
restitution hearing in violation of Cabrera's right to counsel, this Court should correct the 
error. See Nelson-Waggoner, supra (Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances 
doctrine in cases involving "'rare procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid 
manifest injustice). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's award of restitution. 
Respectfully submitted on this^^ day of June, 2006. 
MAM 
Edward K. Brass 
Counsel for Mr. Cabrera 
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ADDENDUM 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
J L . L f t 2 0 Q 5 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT ^ - , r ; ™ Y 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A f t — ^ ' Guilty Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
vs. ORDER ON RESTITUTION 
NICHOLAS CABRERA, 
Case No. 051903850 
Defendant. Judge John Paul Kennedy 
The Defendant in this matter was initially charged with two third-degree felonies (two 
counts of driving under the influence of alcohol resulting in serious bodily injuries). He was also 
charged with a Class B misdemeanor (no insurance), and two Class C misdemeanors (crossing 
the center line and no driver's license). 
The Defendant and the State reached a plea agreement, settling the matter and avoiding a 
jury trial on the original charges. The plea agreement required the Defendant to plead guilty to 
two Class A misdemeanors (driving under the influence of alcohol with resulting injuries) and 
one Class B misdemeanor (no insurance), [n accord with the agreement, the Defendant pled 
guilty to the two Class A misdemeanors and one Class B misdemeanor. It was alleged that the 
Defendant had driven his vehicle head-on into the vehicle of Rebecca Mecham. Defendant, Ms. 
Mecham, and her step-daughter, Amber, were all severely injured in the collision. 
The matter was set for sentencing on December 13, 2004, before Judge Stephen Roth. At 
1 
that time, the Court imposed jail, fine, and probation, including a condition that Defendant pay 
restitution in the initially-determined amount of $80,000 to Rebecca Mecham1 (one of the 
victims), said amount to be paid in installments equal to one-half of the Defendant's income. 
The exact amount of restitution was to be determined at a restitution hearing which was 
scheduled to occur on March 7, 2005. 
On March 7, 2005, Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to any restitution. The 
State replied in support of its claim that restitution be paid. In essence, the Defendant argued 
that he had been adjudicated bankrupt with all debts discharged in May of 2004. He further 
contended that the victims had received $25,000 each from an uninsured motorist policy, and that 
therefore, any restitution would constitute double payment. The State argued that a restitution 
obligation resulting from a DUI-with-injuries conviction was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
The State further contended that the insurance company was a "victim" and thereby entitled to 
restitution for payments made for losses stemming from the collision. Because the payments to 
the other victims had been deducted from the amounts of restitution claimed for them, the State 
maintained that there were no double payments being requested. 
On March 28, 2005, the Court (Judge John Paul Kennedy) initially indicated that the 
restitution obligation of the Defendant would not be deemed to have been discharged in 
bankruptcy and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. On the same day after the hearing, the 
Court received by fax Defendant's further memorandum in opposition to restitution. 
On April 14, 2005, the State file its proposed Motion for Restitution in the above matter. 
On April 19,2005, the parties appeared at the evidentiary hearing. The Court, sua sponte, cited 
1
 This victim's prior surname was Desmarais. 
2 
to a recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (Hon. G. Clark), In the 
matter ofTrojf, wherein a debtor's restitution obligation was held to be discharged in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. Based on that decision, the Court directed Defendant's counsel to 
prepare findings and conclusions supporting Defendant's contentions. 
The Defendant failed to prepare the requested papers, and on May 10, 2005, the State 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the Court to distinguish the Troff decision and hold 
the Defendant responsible for restitution in the amount claimed by the State. 
The Court set the matter for status review on May 20, 2005. On that date, the parties 
were present and Defendant informed the Court that a lengthy document had been filed a day or 
two before. Because this recent filing had not yet reached the Court's file, the matter was 
continued for further review and possible evidentiary hearing on June 17, 2005. Following the 
filing of Defendant's memorandum in opposition to the State's motion to reconsider the Court's 
ruling, Defendant's counsel submitted a motion to withdraw. On June 17, a hearing in this 
matter was held with the State ready to proceed with witness testimony, but Defendant had not 
obtained new counsel. Thus, the matter was continued until July 8, 2005, with the caveat to all 
parties that the matter would be heard at that date without further delay. 
On July 8, 2005, the State appeared at the hearing, again ready to proceed. Defendant 
appeared, but indicated for the first time to the Court that he had not been able to obtain counsel. 
The State expressed its desire to proceed under the circumstances and especially since 
Defendant had been previously advised that no further continuances would be granted. The State 
presented testimony and documentary evidence of Rebecca Mecham's financial losses. The State 
indicated that restitution claims based upon Amber Mecham's and Allied Insurance Company's 
losses were withdrawn. 
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Findings of Fact: 
1. On May 17, 2003, Defendant Nicholas Cabrera (herein, "the Defendant") was operating a 
motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Utah law and resulting in 
bodily injuries to Rebecca Mecham and her step-daughter, Amber Mecham. 
2. On February 14, 2004, the Defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7, 
listing the individual victims and Allied Insurance Company as creditors, but not listing 
the State of Utah as a creditor. 
2. On April 19, 2004, an Information was filed, charging the Defendant with two 3d degree 
felonies (DUI with serious bodily injuries), one Class B misdemeanor (no insurance), and 
two Class C misdemeanors (crossing the center line and no driver's license). 
3. On May 19, 2004, the Defendant was determined to be bankrupt and his debts were 
discharged by the United States Bankruptcy Court (Hon. W. Thurman) for the District of 
Utah. 
4. On September 30, 2004, the Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement 
wherein the charges against the Defendant were amended. As a part of the settlement, the 
Defendant pled guilty to two Class A misdemeanors (DUI with injuries) and one Class B 
misdemeanor (no insurance). The remaining charges were dismissed. 
5. As a part of the agreement, the Defendant admitted: 
On or about the 17th day of May, 2003, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I operated a 
motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol to a degree that I could not safely do 
so, injuring two people. 
The Defednant further stated in the agreement: 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
4
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crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed 
as a part of the plea agreement. 
6. As a matter of practice, the Court uses restitution as one of many sentencing options to 
further the interests of the State of Utah. Restitution furthers the interest of the State in 
punishing and rehabilitating those who commit crimes. In such matters, the Court by 
statute considers the victims' claim for restitution, and gives great attention to the 
Defendant and his situation. As a part of sentencing, the Court considers the restitution 
requirement to be flexible and tailors restitution to the Defendant's situation. 
7. The victims in this matter under UCA 77-38a-102—302 are: 
a. Rebecca Mecham (currently 27 years old); 
b. Amber Mecham; and 
c. Allied Insurance, 
all of whom suffered pecuniary damages as a result of Defendant's violation of the law. 
Because the State withdrew the claim for restitution on behalf of Amber Mecham and 
Allied Insurance, no restitution is determined to be owing as a result of any losses 
suffered by those two victims. 
8. Based upon the evidence presented to the Court, the Court finds that the amount of 
economic loss suffered by the remaining victim, Rebecca Mecham, as a result of the 
offense is as follows: 
a. medical and hospital: $81,735.63, less payments of $3,000 and $25,000,2 or a net 
2
 At the hearing, there was an issue raised as to whether Rebecca Mecham received 
an insurance payment of $25,000, similar to the amount of a payment admittedly made by the 
insurance company to Amber. In a letter dated January 23,2004, from Allied Insurance to 
Defendant's attorney (which letter is a part, of the Court's file), Allied identified that two 
payments, each in the amount of $25,000, were in fact made—one to Amber and one to Rebecca. 
of $53,735.63, to-date. 
b. Loss of equity in home: $40,000.00 
c. Loss of value of personal property including repossessed vehicle: $30,000.00 
d. Loss of income to-date: (based upon prior earnings of $37,500.00 per year) 
$78,000.00. 
9. Complete restitution for each victim, based upon the evidence presented, is as follows: 
a. Rebecca Mecham: $201,735.63. Ms. Mecham continues to accumulate 
additional losses for medical expenses. Further, because she is unable to work 
due to her injuries, she continues and will continue to suffer lost income from now 
until her expected date of retirement (at age 65), a total of 37 years in an amount 
equal to $37,500.00 per year. It is possible that Ms. Mecham may avoid incurring 
some of these losses by declaring bankruptcy, but as of yet, she has not been 
adjudicated to be bankrupt. 
b. Amber Mecham: $0.00 
c. Allied Insurance: $0.00 
10. Court-ordered restitution for each victim based upon the evidence and taking into account 
the Defendant's and the victim Rebecca Mecham's personal situations: 
a. Rebecca Mecham: $102,000.00 
b. Amber Mecham: $0.00 
c. Allied Insurance: $0.00 
These two payments comprised part of the insurance company's initial claim of $62,837.06, 
which claim was withdrawn. 
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Conclusions of Law: 
A. Based upon the foregoing facts and the record as a whole, the Court concludes that the 
obligation of the Defendant to make restitution payments was not discharged in 
bankruptcy. 
B. In this matter, it is contemplated that the restitution would be paid to Adult Probation and 
Parole, an agency of the State of Utah, for deposit into the Victims' Impact Fund, an 
account of the State of Utah. 
C. In this matter, because the restitution issue was left open, the actual imposition of the 
sentence has not yet been completed until this order is entered. 
D. The restitution required in this matter (to the extent it does not exceed the pecuniary 
losses of the victims) is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, and specifically, was not 
discharged in the Defendant's bankruptcy proceeding for the reasons stated below: 
(1) Because the restitution obligation stems from personal injuries which were 
incurred as a direct result of the Defendant's unlawful operation of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the obligation is excepted from 
discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. Section 523(a)(9). 
(2) Because the restitution obligation resulted from a plea agreement, which is a 
settlement agreement entered into by the Defendant, it is excepted from discharge 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. Section 523(a)(19)(ii). 
(3) Because the restitution obligation resulted from a court order for restitutionary 
payment, it is excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. Section 
523(a)(19)(iii). 
E. Because the order of restitution is excepted from discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding 
7 
as noted above, it is not necessary in this decision for this Court to determine whether the 
Court's initial ruling as to the applicability of the reasoning in the Troff decision should 
be reconsidered. The debt here may be considered a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to 
and for the benefit of a governmental unit. Whether or not restitution is "compensation 
for actual pecuniary loss" (under the bankruptcy statutes), however, is not decided herein. 
And the question of whether the bankruptcy statutes implicitly require that to be an 
exception from discharge, the debt must be solely compensation for pecuniary loss is also 
not decided herein. In this instance, it should be noted, however, the Court would 
conclude that the restitution debt is not solely compensation for pecuniary loss. The 
benefit obtained by the State is also not merely a financial benefit, as noted above. 
F. In this case, the State certainly considers the interests of the victims; however, it cannot 
be said that the State represents the interest of the victims and certainly, in the bankruptcy 
action, it cannot be said that the interests of the State were represented by the victims. 
G. Because there was no notice to the State in the bankruptcy action, and perhaps for other 
valid legal reasons as well, the State was not and cannot be considered to have been a 
party to the bankruptcy proceeding and thus, the State is not bound by any rules of claim 
preclusion in this matter. 
H. The imposition of a restitution order by the Court in this matter does not constitute a "re-
trial" of the bankruptcy proceeding. This is true because: 
(1) As already noted, the State was not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. 
(2) No issue regarding an obligation, which stems from a court order as a part of a 
sentence in a criminal conviction and requires restitution, was ever presented in 
the bankruptcy proceeding. 
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(3) Indeed, no such issue could have been raised because the Defendant was 
presumed to be innocent and no conviction was entered until months following 
the final adjudication in the bankruptcy court. 
(4) The Defendant agreed to be responsible for restitution as a part of a settlement 
plea agreement, which also post-dated the final adjudication in the bankruptcy 
court. 
I. It is therefore appropriate that the Court, as a part of the probation conditions of the 
Defendant's sentence, issue an order requiring the Defendant to make restitution 
payments to Adult Probation and Parole for transfer into the Victims' Impact Fund. 
J. The Court records the following reasons for imposing restitution in this matter: 
(1) The Defendant agreed to pay restitution as a part of his plea agreement. 
(2) The Court believes that payment of restitution in this matter will help the 
Defendant better understand the severity of the consequences of his actions. 
(3) The Court believes that by being required to pay restitution, the Defendant will be 
more effectively deterred from committing further crimes in the future. 
(4) The Court believes that for justice to be served in this matter, Defendant should be 
required to pay restitution in the amount and at the rate indicated herein. 
K. In determining the amount of Court-ordered restitution, the Court considered the 
pecuniary losses incurred by the victim Rebecca Mecham, including real and personal 
property losses, income losses, and medical and hospital expenses. 
L. In determining the amount of Court-ordered restitution, the Court also considered (1) the 
financial resources of the Defendant, who possesses little education and has earned only 




financial obligations; (2) the ability of the Defendant to make payments on an installment 
basis; (3) rehabilitative effect on the Defendant because of his being ordered to make the 
restitution payments; and (4) other circumstances including the fact that his wife earns 
only $7.75 per hour and that the couple, although young, has of yet no children. 
M. The Court concludes that the Defendant can and should make restitution payments on an 
installment basis in the amount of $500.00 per month, beginning not later than the 5th day 
of each month, commencing August 2005 and ending in July 2022. 
Commencing not later than August 5th, 2005, and continuing monthly thereafter until and 
including July 5th, 2022, the Defendant shall make restitution payments to the Utah 
State's Victims' Impact Fund in the monthly amount of $500.00. 
II. The office of the State's Victims' Impact Fund may recover said amounts from any 
payments due to Defendant and may garnish wages, bank accounts, tax refunds, or other 
assets to effect collection. 
III. If Defendant voluntarily permits the collection of said payments, no service charges or 
other fees shall be assessed. 
IV. Failure to make payments when due shall be considered cause for probation revocation or 
a contempt of court citation against the Defendant. 
V. This Order shall be deemed to be a final order. j^& ®F0/^ 
Dated: July 11,2005. 
BY THE COURT 
Paul Kennedy, Third District Judge 
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PERTINENT STATUTES 
(B) a loan from a thrift savings plan permitted under subchapter III of chapter 84 of title 
5, that satisfies the requirements of section 8433(g) of such title; 
but nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide that any loan made under a 
governmental plan under section 414(d), or a contract or account under section 403(b), of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 constitutes a claim or a debt under this title; or 
(19) that-
(A) is for--
(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as that term is defined in section 
3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), any of the State securities laws, or any 
regulation or order issued under such Federal or State securities laws; or 
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security; and 
(B) results, before, on, or after the date on which the petition was filed, from-
(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in any Federal or State judicial 
or administrative proceeding; 
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor; or 
(iii) any court or administrative order for any damages, fine, penalty, citation, 
restitutionary payment, disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment owed 
by the debtor. 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "return" means a return that satisfies the 
requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements). 
Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a 
final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made 
pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or a similar State or 
local law. 
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a debt that was excepted from 
discharge under subsection (a)(1), (a)(3), or (a)(8) of this section, under section 17a(l), 
17a(3), or 17a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, under section 439A of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965, or under section 733(g) of the Public Health Service Act in a prior case 
concerning the debtor under this title, or under the Bankruptcy Act, is dischargeable in a 
case under this title unless, by the terms of subsection (a) of this section, such debt is not 
dischargeable in the case under this title. 
(c)(1) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor shall be 
discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection (a) of 
this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after notice 
and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under 
paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section. 
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a Federal depository institutions regulatory 
agency seeking, in its capacity as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for an insured 
depository institution, to recover a debt described in subsection (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), or 
(a)(l 1) owed to such institution by an institution-affiliated party unless the receiver, 
conservator, or liquidating agent was appointed in time to reasonably comply, or for a 
Federal depository institutions regulatory agency acting in its corporate capacity as a 
successor to such receiver, conservator, or liquidating agent to reasonably comply, with 
subsection (a)(3)(B) as a creditor of such institution-affiliated party with respect to such debt. 
(d) If a creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt under 
subsection (a)(2) of this section, and such debt is discharged, the court shall grant 
judgment in favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the 
proceeding if the court finds that the position of the creditor was not substantially 
justified, except that the court shall not award such costs and fees if special circumstances 
would make the award unjust. 
(e) Any institution-affiliated party of an insured depository institution shall be considered 
to be acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the purposes of subsection (a)(4) or (11). 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed— Civil penalties-
Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
1. (a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person 
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting 
the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, and 
payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further 
defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an 
offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as 
part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the defendant 
to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation 
expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is 
issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be 
calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant transported 
regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to 
resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he 
has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the 
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the defendant 
to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration in the county 
correctional facility before and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the county 
correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility through a 
contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 64-13c-301 
if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility as a condition of 
probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8). 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are: 
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs established 
under Section 64-13c-302; and 
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed the negotiated 
reimbursement rate established under Subsection 64-13c-302(2). 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred by the 
county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as 
an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental health treatment for 
the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-ordered restitution under 
this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria provided under Subsections 77-3 8a-
302(5)(c)(i) through (iv). 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsection 
(6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the 
defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
(7)(a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated 
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity 
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in 
writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest 
term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, 
including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the 
sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper 
or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child, object 
rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes substantial 
bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and 
admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be 
sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. This Subsection (8) takes precedence 
over any conflicting provision of law. 
11U.S.C. 523 
523. Exceptions to discharge 
(a) A discharge under 
1. section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an 
individual debtor from any debt-
(1) for a tax or a customs duty— 
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8) of this title, 
whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed; 
(B) with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or notice, if required— 
(i) was not filed or given; or 
(ii) was filed or given after the date on which such return, report, or notice was last due, 
under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years before the date of the 
filing of the petition; or 
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in 
any manner to evade or defeat such tax; 
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the 
extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement 
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition; 
(B) use of a statement in writing— 
(i) that is materially false; 
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition; 
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such money, property, services, 
or credit reasonably relied; and 
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive; or 
(C)(i) for purposes of subparagraph (A)--
(I) consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $500 for luxury 
goods or services incurred by an individual debtor on or within 90 days before the order 
for relief under this title are presumed to be nondischargeable; and 
(II) cash advances aggregating more than $750 that are extensions of consumer credit 
under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or wilhin 70 days 
before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; and 
(ii) for purposes of this subparagraph— 
(I) the terms "consumer", "credit", and "open end credit plan" have the same meanings as 
in section 103 of the Truth in Lending Act; and 
(II) the term "luxury goods or services" does not include goods or services reasonably 
necessary for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. 
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the name, if known 
to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit-
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this subsection, 
timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of 
the case in time for such timely filing; or 
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this subsection, 
timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a determination of dischargeability 
of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual 
knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request; 
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny; 
(5) for a domestic support obligation; 
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of 
another entity; 
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit 
of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax 
penalty— 
(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection; or 
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred before three years before 
the date of the filing of the petition; 
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an 
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents, for— 
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a 
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a 
governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or 
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or 
stipend; or 
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 
221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an 
individual; 
(9) for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle, 
vessel, or aircraft if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from 
using alcohol, a drug, or another substance; 
(10) that was or could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor in a prior case 
concerning the debtor under this title or under the Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor 
waived discharge, or was denied a discharge under section 727(a)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or 
(7) of this title, or under section 14c(l), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7) of such Act; 
(11) provided in any final judgment, unreviewable order, or consent order or decree 
entered in any court of the United States or of any State, issued by a Federal depository 
institutions regulatory agency, or contained in any settlement agreement entered into by 
the debtor, arising from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity 
committed with respect to any depository institution or insured credit union; 
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by the debtor to a Federal 
depository institutions regulatory agency to maintain the capital of an insured depository 
institution, except that this paragraph shall not extend any such commitment which would 
otherwise be terminated due to any act of such agency; or 
(13) for any payment of an order of restitution issued under title 18, United States Code; 
(14) incurred to pay a tax to the United States that would be nondischargeable pursuant to 
paragraph (1); 
(14A) incurred to pay a tax to a governmental unit, other than the United States, that 
would be nondischargeable under paragraph (1); 
(14B) incurred to pay fines or penalties imposed under Federal election law; 
(15) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in 
paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in 
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of 
record, or a determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit; 
(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable after the order for relief to a 
membership association with respect to the debtor's interest in a unit that has 
condominium ownership, in a share of a cooperative corporation, or a lot in a 
homeowners association, for as long as the debtor or the trustee has a legal, equitable, or 
possessory ownership interest in such unit, such corporation, or such lot, bul nothing in 
this paragraph shall except from discharge the debt of a debtor for a membership 
association fee or assessment for a period arising before entry of the order for relief in a 
pending or subsequent bankruptcy case; 
(17) for a fee imposed on a prisoner by any court for the filing of a case, motion, 
complaint, or appeal, or for other costs and expenses assessed with respect to such filing, 
regardless of an assertion of poverty by the debtor under subsection (b) or (f)(2) of 
section 1915 of title 28 (or a similar non-Federal law), or the debtor's status as a prisoner, 
as defined in section 1915(h) of title 28 (or a similar non-Federal law); 
(18) owed to a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other plan established under 
section 40 L 403. 408. 408A. 414. 457, or 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 
under-
(A) a loan permitted under section 408(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, or subject to section 72(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or 
